

From Indifference to Making the Difference: New Networked Information Technologies (NNITs) and Patterns of Political Participation Among Korea's Younger Generations

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ABSTRACT. Despite high expectations for how *new networked information technologies* (NNITs) could influence democratic outcomes, few studies have provided clear evidence that NNITs have changed political discourse or election outcomes. With this in mind, this paper examines how young, politically indifferent, Korean NNIT users involved themselves in mainstream Korean political discourse and became the linchpin in the election of President Roh Moo-hyun in 2002. In the information age, demonstration effects from NNIT-induced mobilizations can bring about dramatic changes in electoral politics. The Korean experience in 2002 suggests that while turnout declined among all generational groups in general, NNITs can play a decisive role in shaping the political cohesiveness and voting patterns of younger generational groups in electoral politics. doi:10.1300/J516v04n01_05 [Article copies available for a fee from The Haworth Document Delivery Service: 1-800-HAWORTH. E-mail address: <docdelivery@haworthpress.com> Website: <http://www.HaworthPress.com> © 2007 by The Haworth Press. All rights reserved.]

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*INTRODUCTION*¹

The Internet, mobile phones, Short Message Service (SMS), and other new networking tools, referred to collectively in this paper as *new networked information technologies*

(NNITs), are quickly penetrating the lives of people across the globe, especially among younger generations. NNITs have the ability to spread information and to mobilize large numbers of people around social or political events, rapidly transforming social and political con-

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sciousness. For example, after the September 11 terrorist attacks, young Americans turned to the Internet as a source of community that likely “sets a pattern for the rest of their lives” (as quoted in Ludden, 2004).² In much of the literature on youth turnout and civic engagement, the political participation of younger generations is generally analyzed in terms of what factors will stimulate or increase their voter turnout. For this reason, it is not surprising that political parties and political action committees co-opted NNITs during the 2004 U.S. presidential election with explicit “get out the vote” campaigns. Internet campaign activities at sites such as meetup.com, moveon.org, and rockthevote.com garnered considerable media attention in their attempt to co-opt the younger generations’ infatuation with the Internet.

Subsequently, the 2004 U.S. presidential election spurred much excitement and a flurry of academic research over polls that indicated young voter turnout had increased to levels unseen since the early 1970s. According to The Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning & Engagement (2004), “at least 20.9 million Americans under the age of 30 voted in 2004, an increase of 4.6 million over 2000, and the turnout rate among these voters rose from about 42.3% to 51.6%, a sharp rise of 9.3 percentage points” (p. 1).³ Rainie (2000) and Rainie et. al. (2005) argue that the use of the Internet and NNITs in political campaigns can increase the overall turnout among younger voters to such an extent that it can dramatically affect electoral outcomes. Though the use of the Internet and other NNITs did increase voter turnout among younger generations in America in 2004, the results did not match expectations of how the influence of younger voters would affect the electoral outcome (Ludden, 2004).

By focusing on voter turnout, this research misses an important alternative explanation for NNITs’ effect, which was highlighted in the 2002 Korean presidential election. The data from that presidential election suggests that NNITs can also lead to the formation of a cohesive voting bloc among otherwise indifferent younger generations, a phenomenon that can dramatically shift electoral outcomes.⁴ In the Korean case, a causal relationship between NNITs, *voter cohesion*, and electoral outcomes is more plausible than one between NNITs, *in-*

creased voter turnout, and electoral outcomes. For instance, though arguably the most wired individuals on the planet, the use of NNITs by younger generations in Korea did not turn around their declining voter turnout rate in the 2002 presidential election there. Despite declining turnout and a paternalistic Confucian political culture that traditionally reserves primary political voice for respected seniors rather than inexperienced youngsters,⁵ the younger generations in Korea suddenly became a formidable political power. Young voters concentrated and channeled their votes toward presidential candidate Roh in a pattern unseen in previous elections. It is in this way that the two younger generations, the 386 and the 2030 Generations, came to cast the decisive vote in a Korean presidential election that had been too close to call. Instead of only measuring the effect of the Internet and NNITs on younger generations’ political participation through overall turnout, attention should also focus on NNITs’ effects on generational voting patterns, particularly on cohesion.

What is the relationship between NNITs, generational voting patterns, and electoral outcomes? The argument presented below in answer to this question is that NNIT-induced mobilizations create the generational social capital and consciousness necessary to form a cohesive generational voting bloc with the potential to dramatically affect electoral outcomes in a tight election. I identify three conditions that explain how NNITs aid younger generations in making the leap from politically indifferent and insignificant to politically powerful and relevant:

- First, rapid and broad deployment of NNITs with the highest concentration among younger generations of eligible voters;
- Second, NNIT-induced, test-run mobilizations around non-political, social events salient to younger generations;
- Third, build up of generational consciousness and cohesion as a result of NNIT-induced mobilizations.

The political power of NNIT users in Korea could not have been realized without the deep penetration and the broad deployment of

NNITs among younger generations (Chang, 2006; Gallup Korea, 2003; Huh, 2003; H. Kim, 2003; Lee, 2006; MacKinnon, 2005, p. 331; Min, 2004; Roh, 2002; SICH-NMDP, 2003; Song, 2003; Song, 2005; Watts, 2003). The creation of a cohesive voting bloc using NNITs requires the intermediate phase where a generation mobilizes around salient events. Successful mobilizations lead to demonstration effects where the younger generations learn to utilize NNITs as tools for political action, come to form generational consciousness, and begin to recognize their own power in the political arena.

From 2000 to 2002, there was a rapid and broad deployment of NNITs among younger Koreans. At the same time, members of younger generations began to participate in NNIT-induced social and political movements. This phenomenon suggests that the study of mobilizations using NNITs is increasingly relevant. As the margin of victory over the last six presidential elections in Korea has rapidly decreased (Gallup Korea, 2003, p. 269), NNIT-induced political mobilizations have created strong younger generational consciousness and a cohesive younger generational voting bloc that has allowed the younger generations to cast the decisive vote. Post-election analysis by Gallup Korea (2003, p. 271) concluded that Roh's slim victory was not due to changes in the younger generations' voter turnout but to changes in the overall voting patterns of the younger generations. This paper will demonstrate how the increasing consolidation and cohesion of younger generations' voting patterns are linked to the increasing prevalence of NNITs in Korea.

The remainder of the paper is organized into four sections. The first section discusses theoretical arguments about social capital and its relationship with social movements and NNITs. The second section outlines the characteristics of the 386 and the 2030 Generations, details the dramatic informatization of Korea, and relates how explosive informatization has mirrored a similar explosion in civic activism. The third section discusses demonstration effects as they pertain to social movements and how demonstration effects from NNIT-induced mobilizations have been relevant in Korean politics along generational lines. The fourth section il-

lustrates how these effects in the spheres of non-political sporting and social events translated into political mobilization and the consolidation and cohesion of younger generations' voting patterns in the 16th Korean presidential election. The final section concludes with a summary of findings and limitations, and poses questions for future research.

SOCIAL CAPITAL AND NNITs

First, what are the debates surrounding the relationship between social capital and NNITs as they relate to social movements? Social capital is considered one of the most important ingredients for achieving stable democracy and a successful economy (Baron, Field, & Schuller, 2000; Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Edwards & Foley, 2001; Ehrenberg, 1999; Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1995; Wellman & Haythornthwaite, 2002). While Coleman and Bourdieu emphasize functional and instrumental aspects of social capital, Putnam discusses its impacts on collective actions, political participation, and democracy. This paper defines social capital as multiple human resources networks, either actual or potential, with certain characteristics of shared norms, values, attitudes, and trust built through prior collective action that can be utilized for future social and political mobilizations. This paper takes social capital and social movements to be closely connected (Putnam, 2000, p. 152) and to feed on one another (Putnam, 2003, p. 162). Diani's (1997, 2001) argument that social capital is an outcome of a series of social movements strongly reinforces the closely interrelated aspects of these two concepts. Information sharing infrastructures, public discourses, and catalytic events play a decisive role in the actual mobilization of social capital for specific social/political movements.

Other scholars, building on this theory of social capital, have also theorized on the connection between social capital and NNITs (Bimber, 2000; Castells, 1996; Dahlgren, 2000; Delli Carpini, 2000; Kraut & Kiesler, 2003; Putnam, 2000; Shah, Kwak, & Holbert, 2001; Wellman & Haythornthwaite, 2002). Their approaches fall into two broad perspectives: dystopian and utopian. Dystopians claim

that NNITs will decrease face-to-face interactions, social connectedness, and community involvement to such an extent that weakened social trust and bonds will result in the waning of community and democratic fundamentals. In other words, NNIT use decreases social capital, the potential for social movements, and political participation. Utopians, on the contrary, hold that NNITs will increase communications and networks so significantly that a strengthened base of shared values and trust will consolidate civic engagement, political participation, and democracy in general.

Going beyond these two opposing views, Putnam asks the central question of whether “virtual social capital is itself a contradiction in terms,” and concludes that no empirical study has proven “the connection between social capital and Internet technology” (Putnam, 2000, pp. 170-171). He acknowledges that the Internet enhances a network’s capacity to activate a form of “social connectedness and civic engagement” (Putnam, 2000, p.180). He is equivocal, however, as to whether the effectiveness of enhanced network capacity can result in real political actions and outcomes. In this line of thought, he also later concludes that “the Net is unlikely in itself to reverse the deterioration of our social capital” and that “the Internet and the World Wide Web . . . play a surprisingly small role” (Putnam, 2003, p. 9). He implies that social capital should be a prior condition for the meaningful use of NNITs for political mobilization (Putnam, 2000, p. 177).

After Putnam’s call for further empirical study on NNITs and political mobilization, attempts to address the topic have taken two main approaches: psychological and sociological. The psychological approach (Katz & Rice, 2002; Kraut & Kiesler, 2003; Kraut et al., 2001), taking a dystopian stance, focuses on the impacts of the Internet and other NNITs on interpersonal relationships and social networks. Kraut and Kiesler’s (2003) research does not support the idea that the Internet creates more social support nor does it create less loneliness and stress. Rather, “greater use of the Internet doesn’t necessarily lead to larger social networks or more social support” (p. 9). In fact, the psychological approach argues that increased use of NNITs will endanger civic culture due to increased time taken up by NNIT use rather

than by face-to-face community interaction. The potential for NNITs to enhance social networks and to foment social movements, however, should not be ignored.

Taking a more utopian stance in their sociological approach, Wellman and Haythornthwaite (2002) find that the Internet increases social capital, civic engagement, and a sense of belonging to an online community (Kavanaugh & Patterson, 2002, p. 329; Quan-Haase & Wellman, 2002, p. 319). As the Internet is incorporated into the daily routine of individuals, social capital is augmented and becomes geographically dispersed. NNITs create the potential to reverse the decline in social capital by providing a medium for younger generations to cultivate social contacts, to increase their civic engagement, and to build a sense of community (Quan-Haase & Wellman, 2002, p. 295). This line of research leaves scholars with the fundamental question: does augmented, geographically dispersed social capital directly produce more political participation? Quan-Haase and Wellman (2002) conclude that the “Internet supplements political activities but does not change people’s levels of involvement” (p. 312). Their findings show negative, or at least neutral, outcomes when it comes to younger generations’ political participation. The “Internet does not appear to be impelling younger generations to be more politically involved than older generations. Although the Internet provides a viable alternative for acquiring political information and becoming politically active, the youngest and least educated remain the least active” (Quan-Haase & Wellman, 2002, p. 318). Overall, research findings in the sociological approach support the argument that Internet use can instigate social activism, but increased civic activism does not seem to result in increased political participation among younger generations. While the literature implies that the Internet’s impact on younger generations in politics is not consistent, the Korean case presents one example where NNITs have had effects, both political and non-political.

YOUNG GENERATIONS, INFORMATIZATION, AND SOCIAL ACTIVISM

A generation according to Wohl (1979, p. 78) is “an actuality [arising] only when simi-

larly located individuals shared a common destiny and participated actively and passively in the social and intellectual movements that were shaping and transforming the historical situation.” Wohl (1979, p. 210) attributes a generational frame of reference and identification to “great historical events like wars, revolutions, plagues, famine, and economic crisis.” Can generational cohesiveness be built in other ways? This paper argues that the mobilization of younger generations, especially using new technologies like NNITs, requires an intermediate phase of collective actions around smaller political or non-political events. These collective actions can demonstrate efficacy and push younger generations to recognize their potential political power and the rewards their participation and engagement can bring. A cycle of successful protest generates demonstration effects (Cornell & Cohn, 1995; Minkoff, 1997), which incite other constituencies to activism (Minkoff, 1997, p. 779) by raising consciousness, defining occasions for action, and guiding successful tactics for protesters (Cornell & Cohn, 1995, p. 369). In their analysis of strike imitation in France from 1890 to 1935, Cornell and Cohn (1995, p. 367) see the dynamic demonstration effects of protest as akin to critical information about feasibility, popular support for change, and commitment to success. Protesters with NNITs can accelerate the sharing of such critical information on feasibility, support, and commitment. The next section discusses generational characteristics and the explosion of NNITs in Korea before tackling the broader argument about how they interact to affect political outcomes.

The 386 Generation

The 386 Generation embodies many of the characteristics described in the definition of social capital above. Labeled in the 1990s, the 386 Generation includes a 3 to represent that they were primarily in their thirties, an 8 to represent that they were college students in the 1980s, and a 6 to show that they were born before the Internet era in the 1960s. Today, the 386 Generation of activists includes college graduates in their late thirties and into their early forties. This generation played a pivotal role in a series of anti-authoritarian democratic movements

that culminated in the collapse of the South Korean military regime in 1987. The events leading up to the collapse of the authoritarian regime solidified the political cohesion of the 386 Generation and shifted the Confucian state-society relations epitomized by a domineering state and a submissive civil society (Han & Ling, 1998). The 386 Generation formed networks of democratic forces including students, labor unions, and civic organizations. Their political militancy⁶ was a by-product of the democratization movement and the subsequent liberalization of political culture in the 1980s (Choo & Nam, 2001; Kwon & Lee, 2004; Lee, 2006). In other words, their generational cohesion was forged in the fight for democracy. The 386 Generation epitomizes the formation of generational political cohesion caused by major events or crises (Chang, 2006; Choo & Nam, 2001; Chung, 2002; Huh, 2003; Kelly, 2004; Kwon & Lee, 2004; Lee, 2006; Min, 2004; Nippo, 2006; Roh, 2002) and represents how social mobilization was conventionally accomplished without the use of NNITs.

The 2030 Generation

In contrast, the 2030 Generation refers to young people in their twenties and early thirties whose political memories were forged after the South Korean military dictatorship fell in the 1980s. This generation grew up with democracy and relative plenty. Before 2002, the 2030 Generation was oriented toward rampant individualism. It was also technologically wired and demonstrated an indifferent behavior toward politics (Kim, 2002; Gallup Korea, 2003; Huh, 2003; Lee, 2006; Roh, 2002; Song, 2005; Yang, 2002; Yoo, 2002; Watts, 2003). The generational consciousness and the political inclinations of the 2030 Generation have changed along with the explosive growth of NNITs and the demonstrated usefulness of NNITs for mobilizing their peers.

Explosive Growth of NNITs and Civic Activism in Korea

Three major developments stand out in Korea's informatization: (a) extensive Internet usage, (b) heavy concentration of Internet us-

age among the 2030 and 386 Generations, and (c) timing for the increased penetration rate of the Internet among these generations. In the early 1990s, the number of Internet users in Korean society was negligible. In 2001, however, Korea was a full-blown Internet society where more than half the total population regularly accessed and used the Internet (Huh, 2003; Jin, 2002; H. J. Kim, 2003; National Computerization Agency, 2001, 2002; Roh, 2002; Song, 2005; Watts, 2003). Table 1 shows how the number of Internet users doubled each year from 1995 to 1998 and then more than tripled in 1999. In 2003, Korea was ranked number one in per capita vBNS (very high-speed Backbone Network Service) subscriber numbers according to the Portable Internet Statistical Annex, 2004.⁷ Not only the rapid pace of Internet use expansion but also the generational composition and timing of this expansion in Internet use deserve attention.

The generational composition of Internet users in Korea is remarkable. According to Table 2, among Korea's current population of about 47 million, those who are very active Internet users range from elementary-school-aged children to adults in their thirties. In total, they account for 48.3% of the total population. The young generation, then, previously excluded from socio-political discourses, became disproportionately poised to involve itself as a major stakeholder in a new public sphere.

Table 3 shows a dramatic increase in Internet use among the young generation in the late

1990s and in the early 2000s. For students from 7 to 19, and also those in their twenties, the growth of Internet penetration doubled from October 1999 to June 2001. Penetration has almost tripled for Koreans in their thirties. Heavy concentration of NNIT use among the young generation has a direct impact on the progress and direction of the information society in Korea.

Growth in NNITs, generational trends in Internet use, and penetration levels in Korea coincide with the rapid rise in civic activism, an observation corroborated in other scholarly work. As shown by the study of Choo and Nam (2001, p. 25), Korean NGOs flourished during the late 1990s when Internet use increased explosively. Choo and Nam conducted content analysis of articles from major daily newspapers in Korea to ascertain the frequency of activities for four different groupings of civic organizations: *Shi-Min-Dan-Che* (citizen organizations), NGO, *Min-Gan-Dan-Che* (private organizations), and *Sa-Hoi-Dan-Che* (social organizations). According to Table 4, the total number of newspaper references remained below 500 per year until 1995. Since 1996, however, the total amount of newspaper coverage has almost doubled. The year 2000 marked the most rapid increase in newspaper coverage from 1,892 articles in 1999 to 3,512 articles in 2000: an increase of 85.6%. Rapid increases in the mobilization of civic organizations have corresponded closely to rapid informatization in Korea during the late 1990s.

Putnam (2000) claims social capital is a prior condition for meaningful use of NNITs in social movements. The 386 Generation in Korea had already built up militant social capital and a heavily democratic consciousness as a result of democratic movements in the 1980s. Combined with the rapidly growing civic organizations, the 386 Generation provided a platform for the use of NNITs in social and political mobilization. The next section details how social capital and generational consciousness was built up through the mechanism of test-run mobilizations around nationalistic events that provided demonstration effects to the younger generations for utilization in future political mobilizations. These mobilizations also formed, at least temporarily, cohesiveness similar to that found in generations forged in times of crisis.

TABLE 1. Number of Internet Users in Korea (in thousands)

Year	Users
1995	366
1996	731
1997	1,634
1998	3,103
1999	10,860
2000	19,040
2001	24,380
2002	26,270

Source: Korea Internet Statistics Yearbook 2004 by National Internet Development Agency of Korea (NIDA)

TABLE 2. Portion of Young Voters and Internet Penetration by Age (2002)

Age	Percentage of total population *	Percentage of total registered voters *	Internet penetration rate ** (Dec. 2001)
20s	16.9	23.2	84.6%
30s	18	25.1	61.6%
40s	16	22.4	35.6%
50s	9.5	12.9	8.7%
Over 60	12	16.4	N/A

Source: * The National Election Commission, Korea (www.nec.go.kr), re -quoted in Gallup Korea (2003:272), <http://home.nec.go.kr:7070/sinfo/sinfo.htm>

Source: ** National Internet White Paper by National Computerization Agency (NCA), Seoul: NCA, 2002, (p.58).

DEMONSTRATION EFFECTS AND GENERATIONAL MOBILIZATION

Having described the generational actors and having analyzed the combination of rapid informatization and explosive growth in civic activism, I now turn to social movements that took place prior to the election in 2002 to examine their impact on the politically indifferent 2030 Generation. In contrast to the arguments made by Wohl (1979) and others, this paper argues that a series of small, non-political mobilizations offers a formula for building generational cohesion, at least in the short-term. The 386 Generation's Defeat Movement, discussed below, was the first instance of NNIT use for effective political mobilization in Korea; smaller social and non-political movements around sporting events later served to bring the 2030 Generation into the political sphere. In Korea, NNITs and the mobilizations they helped induce played a catalytic role in converting the 2030 Generation into a cohesive, decisive political actor in Korean politics in time for the 2002 presidential election.

The 386 Generation's Defeat Movement as Demonstration

Perhaps unsurprisingly, due to their strong social networks and their past civic action de-

scribed above, the members of the 386 Generation played a dramatic role in the 2000 National Assembly election in Korea. On January 10, 2000, The Citizens' Council for Economic Justice (CCEJ), one of the most influential civic alliances formed by the 386 Generation and other activists in 1989, was joined by the Citizens' Commission for a Fair Election to issue a blacklist of unfit, corrupt National Assembly candidates (Choo & Nam, 2001; Chosun.com, 2000; JoongAng, 2000; Korea Herald, 2000). Traditionally, party candidates in Korea were often selected based on their personal relationships to party leaders or on the amount of funds they contributed to the political party. Consistent with Putnam's work on social capital, it was the 386 Generation, those with pre-existing social capital, that first used NNITs for political mobilization. The Internet, in conjunction with conventional news media, played a catalytic role in forming an alliance of over 1,104 civic organizations. Civic organizations, spearheaded by the 386 Generation, used the Internet to open a political dialogue on the reform of the nomination process and on the establishment of civil society authority over conventional political authority.⁸

The Citizens' Coalition for the 2000 General Election's home page (www.ngokorea.org) recorded approximately 50,000 hits on the first

TABLE 3. Internet Penetration Rate in Korea by Age (%)

	Age range				
	7-19 (20%)*	20s (16.9%)*	30s (18%)*	40s (16%)*	Over 50 (9.5%)*
Oct. '99	33.6	41.9	18.5	12.8	2.9
Mar. '00	51.5	59.1	29.2	8.6	3.3
Aug. '00	65.9	65.9	35.4	18.5	4.3
Dec. '00	74.1	74.6	43.6	22.7	5.7
Mar. '01	81.6	78.4	48.4	29	6.3
Jun. '01	87.6	80.3	54.1	32.2	7.3
Sep. '01	91.1	84	61.3	36.6	8.3
Dec. '01	93.3	84.6	61.6	35.6	8.7

Source: On data from October 1999 to December 2000, refer to *National Informatization White Paper* by National Computerization Agency (NCA), Seoul: NCA, 2001, (p.389). On data from March 2001 to December 2001, refer to *National Internet White Paper* by National Computerization Agency (NCA), Seoul: NCA, 2002, (p.58).

* Percent of total population

five days after it opened in January 2000. The site had an average of 10,569 postings per day, or a total of 856,090 as of the day before the election on April 13 (Civil Organization, 2000). Furthermore, 5,667 people made financial contributions of about 350 million won, (about US\$318,000) to support civic activism on the Internet site: a first in Korean electoral history (2000 General Election Citizen Alliance). The *Korea Herald* (2000), a day before voting, claimed the Internet had made its mark as the most influential public arena and medium for political networking. Out of a total of 299 seats, the defeat movement targeted 86 incumbents. Fifty-nine out of the 86 incumbents on the Citizens' Coalition for the 2000 General Election's home page lost their bids for re-election to the National Assembly. This meant the Defeat Movement's success rate using Internet inspired *civic ostracism* was an astounding 68 percent.

As Cornell and Cohn (1995, p. 367) argue, small groups of militants can be the catalyst for action by others. These groups have variously been termed *initiator movements* (Minkoff, 1997) or *early risers* (Tarrow, 1994). The 386 Generation's Defeat Movement served as a powerful demonstration effect for future mobilizations in its combination of off-line social capital and on-line networking; the movement illuminated the potential and feasibility of the

Internet as a tool for political mobilization. While the formation of generations seems to demand a cataclysmic event that requires long-term sacrifices or struggles, NNITs provide an effective means to expand generational networks faster and deeper around salient issues within the polity in the absence of cataclysmic events. In 2002, the 2030 Generation was transformed from politically indifferent to politically cohesive in the wake of the successful Defeat Movement and a series of nationalistic mobilizations shaped by NNITs (Kwon & Lee, 2004; Min, 2004; Nippo, 2006; Roh, 2002). While the case of Korea in 2002 may be unique in that very few countries have reached the same level of informatization, this case illustrates the impact of NNITs and the demonstration effects of mobilizations on the political cohesion of younger generations.

The First Foray: The 2030 Generation and NNIT-Induced Mobilization

Kohut (in Kavanaugh & Patterson, 2002, p. 329) finds that if critical masses of early Internet users are more civic-minded and actively communicative, they might encourage new users to engage in community building activities and social capital formation. The civic-minded 386 Generation spurred an un-

TABLE 4. News Coverage of Korean Civic Organizations 1991-2000

Year	Citizen org.	NGO	Private org.	Social org.	Total by year
1991	91	0	138	189	418
1992	103	8	212	175	498
1993	102	11	151	152	416
1994	114	16	146	144	420
1995	147	63	108	138	456
1996	323	44	177	210	754
1997	510	50	234	302	1096
1998	631	32	235	311	1209
1999	1183	227	204	278	1892
2000	2515	295	241	461	3512

Source: Table 2 -1 from *Korea NGO Report* by Choo and Nam, Seoul: Hanyang University Press, 2001, (p. 25).

precedented election outcome in 2000 using conventional offline mass media and the Internet effectively. It was this mobilization that created a model for the 2030 Generation to emulate in the next election. Unlike the 386 Generation, the 2030 Generation initially used the Internet primarily in the non-political arena. Two sports related events with nationalistic undertones that occurred in 2002 acted as the catalysts for mobilization and generational consciousness among the 2030 Generation: the 2002 Winter Olympic Games and 2002 World Cup Soccer games.

First, during the Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games in January 2002, a Korean speed skater, Dong-Sung Kim, was disqualified in the men's 1,500-meter short track final after having won the race. Apolo Anton Ohno, a U.S. skater, came in second behind Kim and reacted negatively by throwing his hands up in disgust; Koreans believed Ohno's Hollywood-style action caused the disqualification of Kim for blocking Ohno's forward progress in the final turn. Presuming that Ohno stole Kim's gold medal, young Korean Internet users became enraged and overloaded the official Web site of the U.S. Olympic Committee, causing it to shutdown (CNNSI, 2002; Reuters, 2006).⁹ The domestic and international media attention brought on by this mobilization served to help the younger generations of Korean NNIT users realize their own potential power and the power of a cohesive cyberspace community.

Next, during the World Cup Soccer matches in May and June of 2002, a cumulative crowd of 22 million people spontaneously poured into the streets of Seoul and other major cities to support the Korean national team. The Red Devils, an Internet-based, 120,000-member, national soccer team fan club, mobilized nationwide support. The Red Devils were networked together through NNITs, such as the Internet, instant messaging services, and mobile technologies. The Red Devils also revived the national ethos of a can-do spirit that had been depressed by the Asian Financial Crisis, or *IMF Crisis*, of 1997 (Yoo, 2002). As a result of the non-political social mobilizations emanating from two sporting events in 2002, the 2030 Generation realized its power to set agendas, to build consensus, to network, and to organize real actions all from the comfort of cyberspace. The 2030 Generation was ready to be transformed into a cohesive political force after the death of two Korean girls at the hands of American soldiers.¹⁰

From Sports to Politics— The Anti-U.S. Candle Light Protest

In June 2002, right after the World Cup Soccer mobilization, a U.S. military tribunal in Korea acquitted two U.S. soldiers on charges of negligent homicide. The soldiers had been charged with killing two Korean schoolgirls while driving their armored vehicle. The acquittal, in largely ignoring Korean sentiment, spawned anti-Americanism in a mostly pro-

TABLE 5. Voter Turnout by Age in Korean Presidential Elections, 1992-2002

Age	1992 (14 th)	1997 (15 th)	2002 (16 th)
20-24 years old	69.8%	66.4%	57.9%
25-29 years old	73.3%	69.9%	55.2%
30-34 years old	82.1%	80.4%	64.3%
35-39 years old	85.9%	84.9%	70.8%
40-49 years old	88.8%	87.5%	76.3%
50-59 years old	89.9%	89.9%	83.7%
60 and over	83.2%	81.8%	78.7%
Total	81.9%	80.7%	70.8%

Source: National Election Commission, *An Analysis of Turnout in the 15th Presidential Election*, (Seoul: National Election Commission, 1998); National Election Commission, *An Analysis of Turnout in the 16th Presidential Election*, (Seoul: National Election Commission, 2003); found in Min (2004: 251).

American country. At six in the morning on November 27, a Netizen code-named *Ang-Ma*¹¹ appealed to the public using instant messages to “fill the *Kwanghwamoon* (the main gate of *Kyungbok* Palace, Seoul’s symbolic political center) with the Korean spirit and to bring candles for the victims, *Hyosoon* and *Miseon*” (S. K. Kim, 2003). Within 24 hours, 90% of the total MSN Messenger users in Korea had posted a mourning badge on their homepages (S. K. Kim, 2003) and approximately 10,000 demonstrators (Lee & Choi, 2001) gathered at the *Kwanghwamoon* on November 30 to mourn the deaths of the two girls.¹²

However, what started as a gathering of mourning for the two girls quickly devolved into a massive anti-U.S. demonstration. Disregarding the half-century discourse of friendly relations between the United States and Korea, the NNIT users-turned-activists defied the pro-U.S. stance embodied by the conservative, older generations. The event forced the Korean-U.S. relationship into the political arena for the 2002 presidential election, illustrating the remarkable power of the 2030 Generation’s NNIT-induced mobilizations to shift the political discourse (Lee & Choi, 2001; Roh, 2002; Kim, 2002; S. K. Kim, 2003; Watts, 2003).

Having witnessed the power of the NNITs in several movements and having participated in non-political, social and political movements, the 2030 Generation was poised to become a major political factor in the 2002 Korean presidential election only a few short months away.

These mobilizations served as the catalyst whereby veto power in domestic politics might transfer to the 386 and 2030 Generations as a result of voter cohesion. The Internet-based anti-American political movement also critically affected the presidential election set for December 19, 2002. This political movement mobilized the young generation in favor of the liberal candidate, Roh. The cyber-public sphere of the 2030 Generation successfully created a cohesive counter force to challenge entrenched, conservative politics in Korea.

YOUNGER GENERATIONS AND THE 16TH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

By the end of 2002, young NNIT users were equipped with the social capital and the generational consciousness built through mobilization for a political cause and the use of NNITs as tools of mobilization. What they achieved in the presidential election afterwards was the manifestation of their newly acquired political cohesion. Simply put, without NNIT users’ concerted efforts to mobilize support for Roh Moo-hyun, the election result would have been quite different (Gallup Korea, 2003; H.J. Kim, 2003; MacKinnon, 2005; Roh, 2002; Song, 2005; Sutton, 2006; Watts, 2003). Based on the survey data by the Korean Social Science Data Center on the day of election, H. J. Kim (2003) conducted path analysis on how three inde-

pendent variables (age, Internet, and aid for North Korea) affected the outcome of the presidential election. He found that (a) the younger generation favored the Internet for learning about presidential candidates, (b) the Internet influenced voters' attitudes toward the election and aid for North Korea, and finally (c) those voters who were greatly concerned with the election and favored aid for North Korea voted for Roh. Those who were not concerned with the election but opposed aid for North Korea voted for the conservative candidate Lee (H. J. Kim, 2003, p. 107).¹³ Kim's analysis suggests the Internet not only affected voter choice, but also helped mobilize the 2030 Generation into a cohesive voting bloc capable of casting the deciding vote.

There have been a total of sixteen presidential elections in Korea, and ten of them have been direct votes. The average voter turnout rate is 80.05%, with the highest, 97%, in the fourth election of 1960 and the lowest, 70.8%, in the most recent 16th election of 2002 (Gallup Korea, 2003, p. 271). The records show that as the democratization process progressed in the late 1980s voter turnout rates in presidential elections lowered substantially. In addition, the victory margin for presidential elections has also gradually narrowed from an average of 6.4% in the previous six direct elections to 2.3% in the latest election in 2002. Under these conditions, a well-motivated cohort of critical mass could significantly influence the outcome of an election if it coalesced around one candidate over another. The addition of NNITs provided the tools that led to exactly this type of cohesive young voting bloc in Korea.

In the 16th Korean presidential election, there were three major candidates: Roh Moo-hyun of the liberal New Millennium Democratic Party (NMDP), Lee Hoi-chang of the conservative Grand National Party (GNP), and independent Chung Mong-joon of the National Alliance 21 Party. As president of the Korea Football Association, Chung was boosted by his successful coordination of the 2002 World Cup and ran as an independent candidate. Often the third wheel in the race, Chung made a deal with Roh to select a united front candidate among the two, both liberal, through a poll conducted on November 25 among their party members and the general public. Roh won

the poll mainly backed by his own Internet fan club,¹⁴ *No-Sa-Mo*.¹⁵ As a united front candidate, he began to lead the opposition party candidate, Lee, in several pre-election polls. Despite lead fluctuations in the polls, the news media predicted Lee would win by carrying undecided voters (Gallup, 2003, pp. 311-325; SICH-NMDP, 2003). Surprising everyone, on the eve of Election Day, Chung abruptly announced a withdrawal of his support for Roh.

Chung's last minute withdrawal, announced just eight hours prior to the start of voting, created an urgent need for Roh's supporters to mobilize voters. This emergency situation offered two important by-products for the study of NNITs. First, it provided an ideal opportunity to test the effectiveness of NNITs in mobilizing a large number of people over a short period of time. Second, it explicitly corroborates the correlation between young voters' cohesion and Roh's victory in the presidential election. In that 8-hour window, only high-speed information technology could have achieved such a result. Fearing the loss of Chung's supporters for Roh, *No-Sa-Mo* orchestrated a last minute mobilization of young voters. They maximized the use of all available NNITs, from election Web sites and instant messaging services to mobile phones in their efforts.

Both direct and indirect evidence is abundant that the 2030 Generation used NNITs to build support for Roh. During the 8 hours from 10 p.m. December 18 until the election morning, online activities broke cyber space records (Chang, 2006; Roh, 2002; Song, 2005; SICH-NMDP, 2003; Sutton, 2006, p. 9). Roh supporters rallied using MSN Messenger and mobile phones to encourage their peers by posting and voicing messages like "Let's pick up the phone and make a call to encourage others to vote," or "Let's make Roh president through our power" (Chang, 2006; Kim, 2003a, p. 110; MacKinnon, 2005, p. 331; SICH-NMDP, 2003; Song, 2005). OhmyNews, the first Korean Web site of citizen journalism, responded. Throughout the entire night the website was an epicenter of reform-minded citizens with 6.23 million visitors and 19.1 million page views logged during that period alone (Sutton, 2006, p. 9).

Additionally, data from SK Telecom,¹⁶ the largest mobile phone carrier in Korea with an average of 52.1% share of the total market, sup-

ports the above claim. Due to the emergency mobilization prompted by Chung's unexpected withdrawal, mobile phone call-volumes seem to spike on the day before the election and on Election Day. Comparing the call-volumes on these two days to the normal averages for the month of December produces some stark results. Election Day, an official holiday in Korea, should have a call-volume similar to that of other Sundays in December. Instead, Election Day saw the largest volume of calls with a total 16.4%, about 27.5 million calls, larger than the average for Sundays in December.¹⁷ Wednesday, the 18th, one day before the election and the day of Chung's withdrawal of support, exhibits a similar pattern. After controlling for the Christmas and New Years holidays,¹⁸ it had the highest weekday call-volume for all of December.

It was predicted that lower voter turnout would favor the opposition party conservative candidate Lee (Gallup Korea, 2003, p. 23, p. 269). Indeed, with a low turnout rate of 70.8% on the morning of the 16th presidential election, about 10% lower than the turnout of the 15th presidential election, Roh supporters had reason to worry. They used their mobile phones and the Internet to continually galvanize supporters. From 11 a.m. to 1 p.m., 18 million mobile phone calls were recorded (Gallup Korea, 2003, p. 13; Lee and Choi, 2002; Song, 2003; Song, 2005). This corresponds to the increasing turnout rates throughout the day for voters in their twenties and thirties as reported by the time-stamped exit poll data shown in Table 6. Also, the ruling party Web site recorded 860,855 hits, 200,000 more than the daily average, and the number of postings to the Web site's bulletin board doubled on that day (SICH-NMDP, 2003). Figure 1 documents the amazing increase in hits and posts to Roh's campaign website around Election Day. Specific cyber activities, including official campaign website page views, postings, and replies to previous posts, during the same period also correlate strongly with spikes in the overall hit data described above. For example, on November 25, as shown on Figure 1, Roh was selected as the united front candidate against Lee. His Web site subsequently received 1,254,749 hits and 6,840 postings, the highest recorded in November.

The heavy use of NNITs, especially by the 2030 Generation, however, did not result in the overall increase in voter turnout. As Table 5 shows, there was a steep drop in turnout for almost all age groups from 1992 to 2002, especially in the middle and younger generational groups. In fact, the 16th presidential election marked the lowest voter turnout in Korean history. NNIT use, then, did not bring an overall increase in political participation among the younger generations. Rather, as will be shown below, a well-motivated, cohesive voting bloc made the difference in bringing victory to Roh.

According to Table 6, the turnout of the 2030 Generation dramatically jumped from an average of 13.78% (6 a.m. to 11 a.m.) to an average of 21.13% (11 a.m. to 3 p.m.). Table 7 shows that the conservative opposition party candidate Lee was leading at the polls with an average of 1.6% until 1 p.m. on the election day, when the 2030 Generation's voting rate was lower than those in their fifties and sixties. However, as the voting rates of the 2030 Generation increased and those of older generations decreased after 1 p.m., Roh subsequently took the lead by an average of 1.7% until 5 p.m. While votes for Roh significantly increased from 11 a.m. until 5 p.m., votes for the conservative party candidate, Lee, decreased from 11 a.m. onwards.¹⁹

This provides some evidence that voting patterns of the 386 and the 2030 Generations became more cohesive in their support for Roh as a result of NNIT mobilization. It can thus be argued that a timely use of the NNITs in the wake of Chung's last-minute withdrawal dramatically affected the election outcome. Previous collective action, NNIT communications, and rapid mobilization around the presidential election in the final hours among the younger generations transformed them into a cohesive and decisive voting bloc for President Roh.

To demonstrate the newly formed cohesiveness of the 386 and the 2030 Generations' voting bloc, Table 8 shows that in the 13th and 14th presidential elections younger generations did not display clear voting preferences between liberal and conservative candidates. In these contests, younger voters, contrary to expectations, voted evenly for the conservative Tae Woo Roh, a former military general, and the two Kims of the liberal party. However, the

TABLE 6. Time-Stamped Exit Polls from the 16th Presidential Elections (by Age)

Age	6-9 a.m.	9-11 a.m.	11-1 p.m.	1-3 p.m.	3-4 p.m.	4-5 p.m.	5-6 p.m.	Total %	N
20s	11.4	15.9	20.1	21.6	10.9	9.7	10.4	100	8,231
30s	11.8	16.0	21.7	21.1	10.7	9.6	9.1	100	12,142
40s	16.8	19.8	20.9	18.5	9.1	7.6	7.3	100	12,006
50s	22.4	22.9	21.8	16.0	6.9	5.9	4.1	100	6,595
60s	21.1	31.5	24.8	13.2	4.7	2.8	1.9	100	6,503

Source: Media Research
http://www.media-research.co.kr/cs_center/lecture_view.asp?brd_cd=Ta_lecture&idx_bord=3 ;
 The 16th Presidential Election Exit Poll conducted by Media Research on Election Day, December 19, 2002 (N=45,477 from 199 voting booths).

TABLE 7. Time-Stamped Exit Poll on Voting Patterns—16th Presidential Election

Candidates	6-9 a.m.	9-11 a.m.	11-1 p.m.	1-3 p.m.	3-4 p.m.	4-5 p.m.
Rho	47.5	47.4	47.7	48.6	48.9	49.1
Lee	49.3	49.4	48.7	47.6	47.1	46.8


Source: Media Research
http://www.media-research.co.kr/cs_center/lecture_view.asp?brd_cd=Ta_lecture&idx_bord=3 ;
 The 16th Presidential Election Exit Poll conducted by Media Research on Election Day, December 19, 2002 (N=45,477 from 199 voting booths).

15th election clearly revealed the young generations' preference for the liberal party candidate Kim over conservative party candidate Lee. As Table 9 shows, this trend intensified in the 16th presidential election. Table 9 exhibits a clear distinction in the preferences of presidential candidates between the 2030 Generation and the old Korean War Generation. The 2030 Generation emerged as the most powerful constituent, accounting for 42.4% of the total votes.²⁰ In short, although the amplified use of the NNITs cannot be proven to have brought about an overall increase in voter turnout in the 16th presidential election, they certainly have proved how effective they could be in mobilizing a cohesive voting bloc of young supporters on the coattails of successful social and political mobilizations. NNITs were certainly essential to the victory of the liberal Roh.

CONCLUSION

Due to the uneven global diffusion of NNITs and the different degrees of democratization, it is too early to conclude how NNITs will affect future events in democracies: younger generations' political apathy, waning civic and political participation, and low electoral turnout all seem to point in a negative direction. The literature on these issues is divided and eschews any clear verdict. The overall picture of cyber political discourse and its effects on political mobilization is still hazy. However, non-political, Internet-based mobilizations of younger generations deserve scholarly attention because these mobilizations, as in Korea, may rapidly shift focus away from social, fun-seeking activities and turn to political activities. Understanding the dynamics of NNIT-induced political

FIGURE 1. Internet Activity at the Roh Campaign Website



Source: The Special Internet Campaign Headquarters of New Millennium Democratic Party (SICH-NMDP, January 16, 2003).

discourse and mobilizations will become increasingly important as new generations turn to the Internet as a source of friends, social networks, and political information.

Even though this paper presents the argument that the effective use of NNITs opens up the possibility to solve collective action problems for an indifferent young constituency, documenting NNIT-user mobilization activities is difficult. One reason is that analyzing whether young people are really utilizing NNITs for mobilization, especially for political purposes, is complicated; NNIT users are anonymous in ways conventional activists never were. However, the timing and the context of the 2002 presidential election were ideal because the assumption that NNIT use is deeper and broader among younger generations still closely matches reality in Korea. As the use and deployment of NNITs continues to spread and as populations age, this assumption may cease to hold. Therefore, data collection, while providing some limitations on the argument in this paper, will become even more critical for studying the intersection of NNIT use and politics in the future.

The Korean case is only the first attempt at creating a plausible theoretical account for how NNITs affect generational civic activism and electoral outcomes in democracies. Despite the differences in the level of informatization and regime type, many countries in South East Asia such as Burma (Danitz & Strobel, 1999), China, and Vietnam (Gan, Gomez, & Johannsen, 2004) are under challenge from otherwise minor dissenting voices equipped with NNITs and calls for democracy. This study focused on the demonstration effects of NNIT-induced mobilization on the consolidation and cohesion of young generation consciousness and political behavior. The observations presented above do not corroborate claims that NNITs can increase overall voter turnout as some scholars have predicted. They do, however, corroborate the claim presented at the beginning of this paper that NNIT-induced mobilization builds generational consciousness and voting pattern cohesion that can make the difference in a tight election. The specific consequences of NNIT use and mobilizations will, however, vary widely across societies and regions. Without the high level of informatization, the dense

TABLE 8. Liberal/Conservative Vote Share in Presidential Elections (1987-1997)

Presidential election	Candidate	20s	30s	40s	Over 50s
13 th Election (1987)	Roh, Tae Woo (Conservative)	27.6	34.3	38.8	53.3
	Kim, Young Sam (Liberal)	28.6	26.3	23.2	18.0
	Kim, Dae Jung (Liberal)	27.6	23.9	26.3	21.0
14 th Election (1992)	Kim, Young Sam (Conservative)	35.1	43.4	51.9	63.9
	Kim, Dae Jung (Liberal)	32.8	32.3	33.0	23.9
15 th Election (1997)	Kim, Dae Jung (Liberal)	34.8	29.0	24.1	32.7
	Lee, Hoi Chang (Conservative)	20.0	23.4	23.6	43.7

Source: Taken from Lee and Moon (1996) on the 13th (pp.12-13) and 14th (pp.16-17) presidential elections; also see Research and Research (December 13, 1997) on the 15th presidential election.

TABLE 9. Liberal/Conservative Vote Share in the 16th Presidential Election

Age Group	Rho, Moo Hyun	Lee, Hoi Chang	Totals	N (78,428)
20s	59	34.9	93.9	12,206
30s	59.3	34.2	93.5	18,396
40s	48.1	47.9	96	19,865
50s	40.1	57.9	98	13,611
60 and over	34.9	63.5	98.4	14,350

Source: Exit Poll December 19, 2002, MBC-TV and Korea Research Center (2003:12); (N=78,428 taken from a random sample of 302 voting booths).

population centers, and decreasing the voter turnout in Korea, the outcome of NNIT mobilization could have been very different or even invisible.

The Korean case discloses three steps for NNITs to have an effect on political outcomes. First, NNITs need to penetrate deeply and be spread broadly throughout the general population but with a very high concentration among the young generation. Second, NNIT-induced test-run mobilizations need to occur to provide a series of opportunities to rally around salient, non-political social events. These allow young

generations to mobilize around issues that matter to them, to demonstrate the potential political power of the previously indifferent, younger generations, and to build generational consciousness and cohesion. Third, generational consciousness and cohesion is a resource for future mobilization and can affect the voting patterns of the younger generations.

It is unclear at this point whether NNIT-induced mobilization around non-political events can create the same long-lasting social capital and voting patterns associated with the types of catastrophic events discussed in the lit-

erature on generations and political participation. Generations that have built up social capital and patterns of political behavior through physical interaction are very effective at using NNITs for mobilization purposes. The 386 Generation in Korea provides a good example of this phenomenon. Despite the fact that the youngest Korean generation, the 2030 Generation, seemingly demonstrated that it possessed social capital and cohesive generational qualities, due to the fragmented and volatile nature of NNIT discourse, it is unclear whether their social capital and patterns of political participation are only a temporary phenomenon. The Korean mobilizations discussed above took place in a period of about one year. Can NNIT-induced mobilizations lead to the long-term build-up of social capital? Do NNIT-induced mobilizations, both those that remain electronic and those that result in physical demonstration, lead to the same type of generational cohesion that results from cataclysmic events?

In this sense, research on the impact of NNITs on the 386 and the 2030 Generations' political behavior in the upcoming 2007 Korean Presidential Election could serve as a further step to answer questions about and corroborate the relationship between NNITs, social capital formation/mobilization, and generational patterns of political participation. Lastly, these patterns should also be analyzed for long-term effects. With a divided electorate, the younger generations' continued cohesion and voter strength could seriously influence the direction of Korean politics at the national level.

NOTES

1. All data for this paper have been made available via footnoted web link or via Appendix at the end of the paper. Sources for all tables and figures are also listed below each respective table and figure.

2. See also, Lebkowsky (2005, p. 35); Putnam & Feldstein (2003, p. 128, p. 285); Trippi (2004, p. 104, p. 229).

3. On the increased turnout of younger voters, also refer to The Institute of Politics, April 19, 2005 (p.3) and The Pew Research Center, January 9, 2007 (p.24).

4. In the U.S. case, it has been claimed that the increased turnout among younger generations in America was not able to overcome the manufactured voter cohesion of Rovian principled and religiously-oriented "get

out the base" strategies. See Altschuler and Spitzer, 2006 (p. 7); Wolfson, 2006 (p. 3); The Institute of Politics, April 19, 2005 (p.3 & p.19); The Pew Research Center, January 9, 2007 (p.28-30).

5. See Han and Ling (1998) on Confucian influence in the discourse of Korean politics.

6. See Kelly (2004). The influence of the 386 Generation on Korean politics and the Korean-U.S. relationship was aptly pointed out by Assistant Secretary of State, James A. Kelly: "Too young to have experienced directly the 1950-53 conflict and too often suspicious of U.S. motives, their rise to political maturity challenged us to anchor bilateral relations more deeply, and on . . . a more equal basis."

7. See Ministry of Information and Communications, R.O.K. (2005). Thirty-five percent of the Korean people are projected to have vBNS by 2009. Korea was ranked first in the world in 2003 with 23 vBNS subscribers out of 100. Hong Kong ranked second with 18 per 100 and Canada was third with 14.7 per 100.

8. See Rosell (1999) on new types of governance structures formed by networked civic organizations.

9. The incident, highlighted by both offline and online global news media, was still reverberating during the 2006 Torino Winter Olympics; see Fleschner (2006).

9. See Erickson and Nosanchuk (1990) on the politicization potential of apolitical association.

10. See Kim (2003b). Ki Bo Kim, the owner of user ID "Ang-ma," turned out to be a reporter at OhmyNews where he had made an additional petition for demonstration under an assumed ID. This incident later became a controversy over the possibility that NNIT anonymity could become a tool for scandalous, irresponsible, and manipulative discourses or behaviors.

11. For graphic images of the candle light demonstration at Kwanghwamoon and City Hall Plaza, as well as an interview with Ang-Ma, see Ohmynews article from November 30, 2002; retrieved March 12, 2007 from: http://www.ohmynews.com/articleview/article_view.asp?at_code=96428

12. Watts' *Guardian* article (2003, February 24) aptly describes the victory of Roh as "the rise of Webracy" arranged and supported by 2030 Generation using Internet.

13. Roh (46.8%) defeated Chung (42.2%) with 4.6% margin at the poll conducted by Research & Research on November 25, 2002. *No-Sa-Mo's* influence was especially highlighted in the Southeastern province of Korea, *Kyungsang*. See *Hankook Ilbo* article on February 26, 2007; retrieved March 12, 2007 from <http://news.hankooki.com/lpage/society/200702/h2007022618581421950.htm>

14. See Roh (2002: 13-19). No-Sa-Mo was established by Jeong-Ki Lee, user ID "Old Fox," on April 15, 2000, after the 2000 General Election. At that time, the Web site was named after candidate Rho, nomuhyun.org, but later was changed to <http://www.nosamo.org/>

15. The data provided by SK Telecom is proprietary data provided only for use in this paper and is presented

in full in Appendix A. This limited mobile phone data for the month of December allows a partial picture of how NNITs contributed to the mobilization of young voters in the 16th presidential election.

16. According to Manager Yoon of SK Telecom, there is a big gap in the use of mobile phones between Sundays and workdays (workdays include Saturdays in Korea). In this context, it is relevant to compare the volume of mobile phone calls on Election Day, a non-work day, to call volumes on other Sundays.

17. Korea has a Christian population of over 30%. Increased call volumes in the two days leading up to Christmas Day are to be expected. In addition, the New Year is celebrated quite heavily in Korea, and so the two days prior to New Year's Day are also excluded from the analysis. The mean for the sample of 20 remaining weekday workdays in December is 244,872,098. Given this sample mean, the alternative hypothesis that we would find a true mean of 256,691,063 (the Election Day total) in any given month of December can be rejected at the $p = .0005$ significance level. See Appendix A for full data set.

18. See Seong (2003) and Chang (2006) regarding the increased afternoon turnout for Roh.

19. See The National Election Commission, Korea (<http://www.nec.go.kr>); re-quoted in Gallup Korea (2003, p. 272).

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APPENDIX

Date	Day of Week	Mobile Phone Call-Volumes (# of Individual Calls)
12/1/2002	Sunday	171,138,257
12/2/2002	Monday	249,631,575
12/3/2002	Tuesday	240,849,792
12/4/2002	Wednesday	243,606,735
12/5/2002	Thursday	244,378,163
12/6/2002	Friday	248,857,334
12/7/2002	Saturday	233,855,203
12/8/2002	Sunday	164,628,706
12/9/2002	Monday	237,780,065
12/10/2002	Tuesday	238,629,460
12/11/2002	Wednesday	239,930,339
12/12/2002	Thursday	241,633,104
12/13/2002	Friday	252,110,511
12/14/2002	Saturday	240,050,187
12/15/2002	Sunday	169,379,759
12/16/2002	Monday	245,023,455
12/17/2002	Tuesday	247,609,400
12/18/2002	Wednesday	256,691,063
12/19/2002	Thursday (Election Day)	194,910,687
12/20/2002	Friday	256,582,962
12/21/2002	Saturday	242,009,422
12/22/2002	Sunday	169,531,687
12/23/2002	Monday (Christmas Eve Eve)*	263,782,172
12/24/2002	Tuesday (Christmas Eve)*	291,659,813
12/25/2002	Wednesday (Christmas Day)*	181,937,490
12/26/2002	Thursday	249,264,008
12/27/2002	Friday	255,236,455
12/28/2002	Saturday	233,712,735
12/29/2002	Sunday	162,600,802
12/30/2002	Monday (New Years Eve Eve)*	267,255,800
12/31/2002	Tuesday (New Years Eve)*	298,710,782

* Not included for the purposes of statistical analysis for theoretical reasons; Christmas and the New Year holiday are celebrated vociferously by South Koreans and spikes in cell phone volume are to be expected in the two days leading up to these two holidays.